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Abstract
In this work we begin with a brief survey of set theory and arithmetic to provide
background for a logical procedure to ‘cleanse’ the Axiom of Choice from a proof
of a theorem of Kochen’s. We accomplish this in the following chapters. We then
discuss certain theorems involving definable Skolem functions. These theorems
are used in Chapter 5 to give a construction of a p-adic closure of a p-valued
field. Certain further considerations and open questions are addressed in the final
chapter.
iv
Chapter 1
Set Theory
This chapter begins with a concise coverage of the set theory I will utilize through-
out this thesis; those who feel they have a good grasp of axiomatic set theory are
encouraged to skim or skip. I largely follow Cohen [1].
Set theory was developed from ideas of Georg Cantor in the late 19th century.
Largely due to paradoxes arising from Gottlob Frege’s Axiom of Comprehension
(∃y ∀x(x ∈ y ↔ φ(x)), most famously Bertrand Russell’s Antinomy (use x /∈ x as
φ(x), commonly called the barber paradox), it began to be axiomatised in the early
years of the 20th century by such mathematicians as Zermelo, Fraenkel and Skolem.
The most common system is attributed to Zermelo and Fraenkel and called ZF.
We will use the standard set of logical symbols for “not”, “or”, “and”, “equals”,
parentheses and both lower and upper case letters to represent sets:
{∀,∃,¬,∨,∧,→,↔,=, (, ), x, y, z, . . . , X, Y, Z, . . .}.
It is technically possible to decrease the number of logical connectives and quanti-
fiers. For example, with ¬ and ∨ one can recreate all the other logical connectives
(sometimes called Boolean operators) with suitable, though necessarily longer, for-
mulas. In fact, as computer scientists well know, either one of the operators for
“nor” or “nand” could be used to generate all the others if we made up symbols
for them. Sparser symbol sets, of course, almost always have extensive shorthand
added to them and, while I will adhere to that for the non-logical symbols, it would
require excessive exposition here for tangential points. In addition to these logical
symbols, the ZF system uses one non-logical symbol in what is called the language
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of set theory, LS = {∈}. Here, ∈ is a binary relation symbol which is understood
to mean set membership. This is a very sparse language in which to represent all
of mathematics; we will liberally define new symbols as shorthand. To start:
Definition 1.1. x ⊆ y ↔ ∀z(z ∈ x→ z ∈ y)
x ⊂ y ↔ (x ⊆ y ∧ ¬(x = y)).
The axioms of ZFC are as follows:
(S1) Axiom of Extensionality:
∀x ∀y(∀z(z ∈ x↔ z ∈ y)→ x = y).
(S2) Axiom of the Null Set:
∃x ∀y(¬(y ∈ x)).
(S3) Axiom of Unordered Pairs:
∀x ∀y ∃z ∀w(w ∈ z ↔ (w = x ∨ w = y)).
(S4) Axiom of Union:
∀x ∃y ∀z(z ∈ y ↔ ∃t(z ∈ t ∧ t ∈ x)).
(S5) Axiom of Infinity:1
∃x(∅ ∈ x ∧ ∀y(y ∈ x→ (y ∪ {y} ∈ x))).
(S6n) Axiom Schema of Replacement:
∀t1, . . . , tk(∀x ∃!y(An(x, y; t1, . . . , tk)→ ∀u∃vB(u, v))),
where B(u, v)↔∀r(r∈v ↔ ∃s(s∈u ∧ An(s, r; t1, . . . , tk))),
and An(x, y; t1, . . . , tk), n = 1, 2, . . ., is an enumeration of all the countably
many formulas in our system with at least two free variables, where k = kn ≥
0 depends on n.
1We will define the nullset symbol, ∅, in the discussion below.
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(S7) Axiom of the Power Set:
∀x ∃y ∀z(z ∈ y ↔ z ⊆ x).
(S8) Axiom of Foundation (or Regularity):
∀x ∃y(x = ∅ ∨ (y ∈ x ∧ ∀z(z ∈ x→ ¬(z ∈ y)))).
(S9) Axiom of Choice:
If a function h is defined carrying α 7→ Aα, Aα 6= ∅ for all α ∈ x, then
there exists another function f , called a choice function, such that for all
α ∈ x, f(α) ∈ Aα.
The purpose of Axiom S1 is to exclude atoms, or any non-sets, from the models.
All sets are defined by their members and built up from the empty set. Axiom S2
asserts the existence of an empty set. In combination with Axiom S1, the set x
whose existence Axiom S2 guarantees is unique and therefore can be denoted by a
symbol x := ∅. Some prefer to have ∅ as a constant symbol believing systems like
ours are sparse to the point of ridiculousness; while not following them I sometimes
feel pangs of sympathy. For Axiom S3 we write the unordered pair z = {x, y}. We
also define {x} = {x, x} and 〈x, y〉 = {{x}, {x, y}}, the latter called the ordered
pair of x and y. By Axiom S1 the ordered pair of x and y is unique. From this we
define functions as follows:
Definition 1.2. A function is a set f of ordered pairs such that (〈x, y〉 ∈ f) ∧
(〈x, z〉 ∈ f) → y = z. We call the set of all x such that 〈x, y〉 ∈ f for some y the
domain and the set of all y such that 〈x, y〉 ∈ f for some x the range.
It is important to note for Axiom S4 that it states that y is the union of all the
members of x. We denote this with the unary operator
⋃
x. We can also define:
z = x ∪ y ↔ ∀t(t ∈ z ↔ (t ∈ x ∨ t ∈ y)).
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This is what we more commonly think of as the union of two (or more) sets.
We denote the interated binary operator by
k⋃
n=1
xn. The similarity in notation is
unfortunate but generally quite clear in context. Axiom S5 guarantees the existence
of an infinite set; we will show later how this can be used to define N, the set of
natural numbers.
The Axiom of Replacement, Axiom S6, is a very strong axiom that allows us to
build new sets from old sets by means of formulas with two or more free variables.
This axiom is presented in this way so as to (hopefully) avoid contradictions (most
notably Russell’s Antimony). The reason for this is that the properties An define
functions ϕ so that for each u, the range of ϕ on u is a set v, and v cannot
have cardinality greater than u. This axiom is, for practical purposes, frequently
weakened to the Axiom of Separation (S6*):
∀t1, . . . , tk ∀x∃y ∀z(z ∈ y ↔ z ∈ x ∧ An(z; t1, . . . , tk))
where An(z; t1, . . . , tk) for n = 0, 1, 2, . . . ranges over formulas with at least one
free variable. This is strictly weaker than Replacement and an easy consequence of
it. It allows us to create new sets by separating out all elements with a ‘property’
An.
The power set of a set x is, like the empty set, unique by Axiom S1 and can
be denoted by the unary operator P . It is the set of all subsets of x and can be
written y = P(x). This cannot be defined using Replacement, for the cardinality
of y can be shown to be greater than that of x (a result of Cantor). This allows us
to construct sets of cardinality greater than that of the natural numbers.
Axiom S8 guarantees what is called well-foundedness, hence the name. What it
does is prevent infinite descending chains in ∈; so for example, x ∈ x is prohibited.
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This along with Axioms S1 and S2 guarantee that all of our sets are built up from
∅.
The Axiom of Choice is abbreviated AC and is the most controversial of the
ZF axioms, so much so that we tend to call the first eight ZF and the whole set
of nine ZFC. One reason for this is the exceptionally non-constructive nature of
the axiom and several of its consequences. As an example, ZFC proves that there
exists a well-ordering of the real numbers, but it is impossible to write a formula
φ(x, y) in LS to define it. Other reasons include the sufficiency of ZF for many
theoretical purposes and the interest in investigating certain consequences that
are contradicted by AC [15].
The last important point about ZF (and ZFC) is that it is an infinite axiom
system due to the Axiom Schema of Replacement. There is an alternative system
called GB (Go¨del-Bernays; von Neumann also worked on it) that uses only finitely
many axioms, but to do so it is forced to introduce the idea of a proper class and
a new set of objects in addition to sets, namely classes. Since the purpose of this
exposition is not to present set theory per se we will not go deeper into it (though
we will use the idea of a class to discuss the class of ordinals; in general we do not
require it).
Next we need to introduce the concept of ordinals. One way to generate the
ordinals is to begin with the natural numbers and generalize the concept to infinite
sets. The other route to building the ordinals is to begin with well-ordered sets and
either take canonical representives of equivalence classes or deal directly with the
classes themselves. Since clarity and simplicity is what we are after in this case,
we will build the canonical representives briefly. To begin, we need to define orders
and well-orders.
5
Definition 1.3. A (strict) ordering on a set X is a set R of ordered pairs of
members of X such that:
1) for all x, y ∈ X one and only one of the following hold: x = y, 〈x, y〉 ∈ R,
〈y, x〉 ∈ R. It is customary to write x < y in place of 〈x, y〉 ∈ R; and
2) x < y and y < z imply x < z.
A well-ordering on X is an ordering such that if Y ⊆ X and Y 6= ∅ then
∃x(x ∈ Y ∧ ∀y ∈ Y → ¬(y < x)). This means that any non-empty subset Y of X
has a least element.
In these cases we say that X is ordered (or well-ordered) by < .
To define equivalence classes on well-ordered sets we first need an order that
allows us to compare them; this requires the idea of initial segments:
Definition 1.4. Let X be well-ordered by <. We call Y ⊆ X an initial segment
of X if ∀x, y ∈ X((x ∈ Y ∧ y < x)→ y ∈ Y ).
It can be shown that for any two well-ordered sets there must be a unique order-
preserving map from one onto an initial segment of the other. Note it is quite
possible for there to be such maps going both ways; if so, they are inverses of each
other. We define the non-strict ordering on well-ordered sets to be X ≤ Y if there
is an order-preserving map from X onto an intial segment of Y . If this map is not
onto Y then X < Y ; if it is onto Y then X = Y (the bars are to distinguish between
this last case and set equality). Now is where we could either define the ordinals to
be the equivalence classes for this relation or build canonical representives of said
equivalence classes. To build the latter we need to define transitive sets:
Definition 1.5. A set x is called transitive if (y ∈ x ∧ z ∈ y)→ z ∈ x.
Then we use this definition to define ordinal numbers:
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Definition 1.6. An ordinal is a set which is well-ordered by ∈ and is transitive.
We typically denote the ordinal ∅ as 0. Lower-case Greek letters will be used to
denote ordinals.
This definition then requires a theorem to show that any well-ordered set has
an order-preserving map onto some ordinal α. This is not any great difficulty nor
very important to our purpose. As a corollary we can show that for two ordinals
α and β, if α = β then α = β, and if α < β then α ∈ β. The latter is simply
the definition of the ordering we gave above; the former says that, for ordinals,
isomorphism implies equality. There are two classes of ordinals: an ordinal α is
called a successor ordinal if ∃β(α = β ∪ {β}); we usually denote α = β ∪ {β} as
α = β + 1. If α 6= 0 and α is not a successor ordinal, we call it a limit ordinal.
The natural numbers can now be defined to be 0 and those successor ordinals α
such that β < α→ (β is a successor or β = 0). It is easy to see that the Axiom of
Infinity could be replaced by the statement that a limit ordinal exists. We denote
the least limit ordinal by ω, and it is simple to see that this is the set of all natural
numbers (usually denoted by N).2 The proper class of all ordinals (in the GB sense)
is customarily denoted by On. The ordinals will allow us to extend the usual idea
of mathematical induction on the natural numbers to all ordinals. We call this
transfinite induction.
Transfinite induction will begin similarly to the ordinary sort. Let Φ(α) be a
formula in LS with a free variable α ranging over the ordinals; we begin by proving
the initial condition Φ(0). Then we proceed to check that for successor ordinals
α+1, Φ(α+1) holds if Φ(α) holds. Thus far it is mostly identical to the usual sort
of induction; the new step is to deal with limit ordinals. If α is a limit ordinal, we
2I.e., ω = N.
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show that Φ(α) holds if Φ(β) holds for all β < α. At this point, as with standard
induction on N, we conclude that Φ(α) is true for all ordinals α.
One of the reasons we introduced set theory and transfinite induction on the
ordinals is to look at a method of Kreisel [13], using Go¨del’s constructible universe,
for cleansing AC from proofs. We want to apply this to a result in p-adic fields,
namely Kochen’s analog to Hilbert’s 17th problem. This method, it should be
pointed out, is equally applicable to cleansing the generalized continuum hypothesis
(GCH) from certain proofs; though in our case this will not be needed. The core
idea has to do with Go¨del’s concept of the constructible universe, L, versus the
usual universe of sets, V . Following Solovay’s summary [20], V can be defined as
all sets belonging to some level of the cumulative hierarchy. It is composed of the
sets R(α) defined for all ordinals α by transfinite recursion, as follows:
1) R(0) = ∅.
2) If α = β + 1, then R(α) = P(R(β)) where P is, as above, the power set
operator.
3) If α is a limit ordinal, then R(α) =
⋃
γ<α
R(γ).
Thus V =
⋃
α∈On
R(α). The statement that all sets belong to some R(α) is equiv-
alent to the Axiom of Foundation.
The constructible universe is very similar. However, before proceeding, let us
define the restriction of a formula A.
Definition 1.7. The restriction of a formula A to a set (or class) X, denoted by
AX , is the formula A where all bound variables ∀x or ∃y are replaced by ∀x ∈ X
or ∃y ∈ X.
L is composed of the sets L(α) defined for all ordinals α by transfinite recursion,
as follows:
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1) L(0) = ∅.
2) If α = β+1, then L(α) consists of the union of L(β) and all subsets x of L(β)
that are definable in set theory when the bound variables are restricted to range
over L(β), possibly with parameters (free variables) in L(β). This means that there
is a formula A(z, y1, . . . , yn) of LS with free variables z, y1, . . . , yn, and there are
elements t1, . . . , tn ∈ L(β) such that x = {z ∈ L(β) | AL(β)(z, t1, . . . , tn)}.
3) If α is a limit ordinal, then L(α) =
⋃
γ<α
L(γ).
Thus L =
⋃
α∈On
L(α). A set x is called constructible if and only if it appears in
some L(α) (i.e., ∃α(x ∈ L(α))). This hierarchy is seemingly much more limited
than the cumulative hierarchy (and is considered to be so by most mathematicians).
At any rate, L is certainly a subclass of V . However, utilizing the hypothesis that
V = L, which is not seriously believed by anyone, we can sometimes deduce results
that would be more difficult without it, and in certain cases the assumption can
then be shown to have been unnecessary.
Before we continue we need to take a brief run through a formalization of arith-
metic. First, we usually prefer to discuss arithmetic in a language other than that of
set theory (LS). After all, we prefer to work with binary operators like + and · and
frequently with an exponential operator (binary), a successor operator (unary),
or a binary relation <, as well. This leads to the idea of interpretations, which is
central to the idea that all of mathematics can be expressed in set theory. In fact,
that is almost exactly the idea; that we can define each of the necessary operations
and relations for a particular field of mathematics by means of the language and
axioms of set theory, and so analyze that field of mathematics in set thoery. In
model theory this process of working with one language and axiom system and in-
terpreting it in another is called, fittingly enough, an interpretation. It requires us,
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firstly, to define the non-logical symbols of the first language in terms of those of
the second and then, secondly, to apply this to interpreting the non-logical axioms.
We will use this to interpret arithmetic in set theory.
There are many possible languages for arithmetic, but LA = {S,+, ·, 0} will
do for example. Here S is a unary function symbol designating the successor, +
and · are the binary addition and multiplication function symbols, and 0 is the
obvious constant symbol. We want to interpret this in set theory, whose language
has, please recall, one and only one binary relation symbol ∈, though we shall, of
course, utilize the shorthand we have defined previously. We interpret 0 to be ∅
and S(0) to be ∅∪{∅} (recall that for ordinals this was called 0+1), which we also
denote as 1. A natural number n is interpreted as the nth ordinal number x; thus
a set x is the interpretation of a natural number if and only if x ∈ ω. It remains to
interpret addition and multiplication of natural numbers as suitable set-theoretic
operations on members of ω.
For this we will need the notion of a cardinal number. We first define a new
order relation:
Definition 1.8. If A and B are sets, then A ≤ B if there is an injection of A
into B. A = B if there is a one-to-one correspondence between A and B. A < B
if there is an injection of A into B but there is not an injection of B into A (the
double bar is to distinguish from the order relation on ordinals).
Definition 1.9. A cardinal is an ordinal α such that if β < α then β < α.
We note that every finite ordinal number is a finite cardinal number and con-
versely, so the finite cardinals are precisely the interpretations of the natural num-
bers. Now we can interpret addition on natural numbers. For (finite) cardinals α,
β, and γ, let α + β = γ if and only if (α× {0}) ∪ (β × {1}) = γ. The Cartesian
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products are to ensure that the union is of disjoint sets, so it is ‘counting’ the full
number of elements. Multiplication of natural numbers is interpreted by α · β = γ
if and only if α× β = γ [15].
Thus we have interpreted the language of arithmetic in set theory. For the axioms
of arithmetic, Peano’s are standard; they can now be translated into the language
of set theory by appropriate application of the interpretations we have just given.
What we mean by an arithmetic formula is now defined as any formula in LS that
is the translation of a formula in LA [6] [16].
Before continuing, we need to define a sentence in logic. A sentence is a formula
with no free variables. This implies that it is either true or false once the formula is
interpreted in a structure. This is unlike formulas with free variables, whose truth
or falsehood is dependent on the values input for the free variables. As an example,
think of the formula x + 4 = 2 in LA;3 this could be true or false depending on
what value one assigns to the free variable x. However, if one instead thinks of the
formulas ∀x(x+ 4 = 2) or ∃x(x+ 4 = 2), both in Z, then it is easily seen that the
first is false while the second is true. It is also important to point out that sentences
true in one structure need not be true in another. For example, ∃x(x + 4 = 2) is
not true in N.
Returning now to our use of the constructible universe, we need to discuss the
idea called absoluteness. Absoluteness is a logical idea that looks at sentences
which are true in one model if and only if they are true in another model, usually a
submodel. In our case we wish to compare V , the universe of all sets, and L, Go¨del’s
constructible universe. In this context, a sentence will be said to be absolute if it
is true in V if and only if it is true in L. Note that On is a subclass of L which is
34 = S(S(S(S(0)))), 2 = S(S(0)).
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a subclass of V ; so all ordinals, in particular ω, are in both L and V . This tells us
that every arithmetic sentence is absolute in this sense, because the interpretation
of the natural numbers as ω is identical in V and L (e.g., a quantifier ∀x ∈ ω has
the same effect as ∀x ∈ L ∩ ω, since L ∩ ω = ω).
For our application we would like to introduce certain additional ideas on car-
dinals and the Continuum Hypothesis (CH). We write
ℵ0(= ω) < ℵ1 < · · · < ℵω < ℵω+1 < · · · < ℵα < · · ·
for the sequence of infinite (well-ordered) cardinal numbers. The Continuum Hy-
pothesis asserts that 2ℵ0 = ℵ1 (where 2ℵ0 is the cardinality of P(ℵ0)). We write
GCH for the Generalized Continuum Hypothesis, which asserts that for every or-
dinal α, 2ℵα = ℵα+1.
Finally, suppose φ is an absolute sentence in LS (for example, φ could be any
arithmetic sentence, as above).
Theorem 1.10. Any proof of φ from ZF + AC + GCH can be transformed into
a proof of φ from ZF alone.
To see this, let λ(x) be ∃α(x ∈ L(α)), a formula in LS defining L; recall, for all
x ∈ V , (x ∈ L↔ λ(x)). Now we relativize every line of the given proof of φ to L;
i.e., in every formula in the proof,
we replace any universal quantifiers ∀x · · · with ∀x(λ(x)→ · · · ),
and any existential quantifiers ∃x · · · with ∃x(λ(x) ∧ · · · ).
The resulting sequence of formulas is no longer quite a proof, but it can be com-
pleted to a proof by inserting small pieces of proof in appropriate places.
As an example, one commonly used rule of inference is the generalization rule,
which allows us to write ∀xφ on line i of a proof if there exists a j < i such that
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φ is the formula on line j. This rule does not allow us to pass from φL to (∀xφ)L,
since the latter is ∀x(λ(x) → φL), which is not of the required form (namely,
∀x (φL)). However, since φL is an earlier line in the proof, we can infer λ(x)→ φL
tautologically from φL. Then we may deduce the desired formula ∀x(λ(x) → φL)
by the generalization rule. All the other common rules of inference can be handled
in a similar and fairly straightforward fashion.
Next, Go¨del proved that the relativizations ACL and GCHL of AC and GCH,
respectively, to L, can be proved from ZF. So in the relativized proof of φ, we can
replace any line ACL or GCHL occurring there with Go¨del’s ZF-proofs of ACL and
GCHL, respectively. Thus, the relativized proof of φ may mention ACL or GCHL,
but it does not invoke AC or GCH as axioms. Finally, since φ, the end-formula
of this proof, is absolute, its relativization φL is equivalent to φ. We thus have a
proof of φ from ZF alone.
The idea of using Go¨del’s proofs of ACL and GCHL from ZF to “automatically”
cleanse proofs of arithmetic sentences of any use of AC or GCH, is due to Kreisel
[12]. Go¨del’s original motivation for proving ACL and GCHL from ZF was to show
that AC and GCH are consistent with ZF [9].4
4Later, Paul Cohen showed that ¬AC and ¬GCH are also consistent with ZF [1]. Go¨del’s and Cohen’s results,
together, imply that AC and GCH can neither be proved nor disproved in ZF, partially solving the first problem
in Hilbert’s famous, 1900 list of 23 unsolved problems: to prove or disprove CH. (Curiously, Hilbert published an
incorrect proof of CH in 1926.)
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Chapter 2
Formally p-adic Fields
The first result we would like to present in this thesis is a formal ‘cleansing’ of the
Axiom of Choice from Kochen’s proof of his p-adic analog of Artin’s solution to
Hilbert’s 17th problem (which involved real closed fields) along the lines discussed
in the previous chapter. First, we give a brief overview of the 17th problem and
more details on Kochen’s p-adic analog thereof.
Definition 2.1. LetR be a real closed field (e.g., R). A function f ∈ R(X1, . . . , Xn)
is called positive semi-definite if for all ~x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Rn either f(~x) is unde-
fined or f(~x) ≥ 0.
The 17th problem was to prove that any positive semi-definite function over
a real closed field could be written as a sum of squares of rational functions in
R(X1, . . . , Xn) [2]. Kochen’s analog was to look at functions which are integral
definite over a p-adically closed field and show that they could be written as ele-
ments integral over a special ring that would be analogous to the sums of squares
in the real case. To begin we look at valued fields:
Definition 2.2. A function v from a field K to Γ ∪ {∞}, where Γ is an additive,
ordered, Abelian group (the value group), is a valuation if ∀x, y ∈ K:
(1) v(x) =∞↔ x = 0,
(2) v(xy) = v(x) + v(y),
(3) v(x+ y) ≥ min (v(x), v(y)).
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We call a field K along with a valuation v a valued field. The ring formed by
all elements whose value is greater than or equal to 0 is called the valuation ring,
and is denoted by OK (the K will often be suppressed where no confusion would
occur). The maximal ideal of this ring, which is the ring of all elements of strictly
positive value, is denoted byMK . The residue class field of (K, v) is defined to be
O/M, it is often denoted by K.
Definition 2.3. Let K be a valued field. Then r(X1, . . . , Xn) ∈ K(X1, . . . , Xn) is
integral definite in K if for every ~x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Kn, either r(~x) is not defined
or r(~x) ∈ OK .
For a fixed prime number p we can define a further specialization of a valuation:
Definition 2.4. A valuation, v, of a field K of characteristic 0 is a p-valuation if:
(1) the value group has v(p) as its smallest positive element; and
(2) the residue class field K ∼= Z/pZ.
As an example consider the p-adic valuation on Q. If you take m
n
∈ Q, you can
write it as m
n
= pq a
b
with a, b relatively prime and not divisible by p in a unique
way. The p-adic valuation on Q is v(m
n
) = q.
We will also require an operator that will take the place of the square operator
in the 17th problem, Kochen’s γ-operator:
γ(x) =
xp − x
p((xp − x)2 − 1)
(
=
1
p
(
(xp − x)− (xp − x)−1)
)
, (2.1)
for x ∈ K.
We can now define the three classes of fields that are needed for Kochen’s The-
orem:
Definition 2.5. A field K is called p-valued if it is equipped with a p-valuation.
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Definition 2.6. A field L is formally p-adic over a p-valued subfield K if 1/p /∈
OK [γ(L)]. K is formally p-adic if it is formally p-adic over Q equipped with the
p-adic valutation.
Definition 2.7. A field is p-adically closed if it is formally p-adic and no proper
algebraic extension is formally p-adic.
The main example of a p-adically closed field is Qp, the field of p-adic numbers.
For an example of the development of the p-adic numbers and their arithmetic, see
[11, Chapter 1].
A significant piece of what we are doing will revolve around equivalences with
these ideas; for instance, a field is formally p-adic if and only if it admits a p-
valuation. The following definitions are needed for a theorem on properties of
p-adically closed fields:
Definition 2.8. An ordered abelian group, G, is a Z-group if there is a smallest
positive element in G and |G/nG| = n for all positive integers n.
Definition 2.9 (Hensel’s Lemma). We say that a valued field K satisfies Hensel’s
Lemma, or is Henselian, if for each f ∈ O[X] and a ∈ O with v(f(a)) > 0 and
v(f ′(a)) = 0, there exists an α ∈ O with f(α) = 0 and v(α− a) > 0.
Theorem 2.10. A p-valued field K is p-adically closed if and only if K is Henselian
and the value group is a Z-group.
A proof of this theorem can be found in [18]. This second formulation of p-
adically closed is important because our first definition was not first-order definable
in the language of valued fields (either LM or LW ; see below), because it would
require quantifying over all extension fields of a given field. This second definition
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is first-order definable and helps explain why the axioms for p-adically closed fields
are chosen as they are.
There are two standard languages and axiom systems for p-adically closed fields;
Weispfenning showed in [21] that they are equivalent, so we can use either. The first
is MacIntyre’s language: LM = {+,−, ·,−1 , 0, 1, V, Pn}, for n = 2, 3, . . .; V and Pn
are unary predicates. MacIntyre’s axioms are the universal axioms for commutative
rings with 1 (these may be looked up in any graduate algebra text) as well as new
axioms specific to p-adically closed fields, as follows. Note that the symbols n and
p are not in the formal language. We shall often write n as an abbreviation of the
term (· · · (1 + 1) + · · ·+ 1) with n summands. We shall do the same for p.
(M1)n 1 + . . .+ 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
n times
6= 0 for n ≥ 1
(M2) 0−1 = 0 ∧ (x 6= 0→ xx−1 = 1)
(M3) V (0) ∧ V (1) ∧ ¬V (p−1) ∧ ((V (x) ∧ V (y))→ (V (x− y) ∧ V (xy)))
(M4) ¬V (x)→ (V (x−1) ∧ V ((px)−1))
(M5) V (x)→
∨
0≤i<p
V (p−1(x− i))
(M6)n ∃w
((( n∧
i=0
V (xi)
)
∧V (y)∧V
(
p−1
n∑
i=0
xiy
i
)
∧¬V
(
p−1
n∑
i=1
ixiy
i−1
))
→(
V (w) ∧ V (p−1(y − w)) ∧
n∑
i=0
xiw
i = 0
))
for n ≥ 1
(this is Hensel’s lemma)
(M7)n ∃z((yn = x→ Pn(x)) ∧ (Pn(x)→ zn = x)) for n ≥ 2
(M8)n
n−1∨
r=0
∨
1≤a<p2v(n)+1
p-a
Pn(x(ap
r)−1) for n ≥ 2
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Notice that for Axiom schema 8 we need to define the actual valuation function
v on Q. This is done as usual: write n = pi · a
b
for n ∈ Q and a, b, i ∈ Z, with a and
b (relatively prime and) not divisible by p; then let v(n) = i.
Weispfenning’s language, LW , is a 2-sorted language consisting of an F -sort:
{+,−, ·, 0, 1}; a Γ-sort: {<,+Γ,−Γ, 0Γ,∞, 1Γ,≡n}; and two functions pi : Γ→ F ,
pi(n) = pn, a cross-section, and v : F → Γ the valuation.1 The axioms are those for
commutative rings with 1 (F -sort), those for ordered Abelian groups with 0Γ and
1Γ (Γ-sort), and the following (x, y, z, . . . will be used for F -variables, ξ, η, ζ, γ, . . .
will be used for Γ-variables, n and p are F -abbreviations as they were in LM above):
(W1)n 1 + . . .+ 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
n times
6= 0 for n ≥ 1
(W2) ∃y(x 6= 0→ xy = 1)
(W3) (v(x) =∞↔ x = 0) ∧ (v(xy) = v(x) +Γ v(y)) ∧
((v(x) ≤ v(y))→ (v(x) ≤ v(x+ y)))
(W4) (ξ 6= 0→ (ξ +Γ (−Γξ) = 0Γ)) ∧ (ξ +Γ∞ =∞) ∧ (−Γ∞ =∞) ∧ (1Γ 6=∞) ∧
(ξ 6=∞→ ξ <∞)
(W5) (v(pi(ξ)) = ξ) ∧ (pi(ξ +Γ η) = pi(ξ)pi(η)) ∧ (pi(1Γ) = p)
(W6)n ξ 6= 0→
∨
0≤r<n
ξ ≡n r for n ≥ 2
(W7)n ∃ζ((ξ ≡n η → ζ +Γ · · ·+Γ ζ︸ ︷︷ ︸
n times
+Γξ = η) ∧ (γ +Γ · · ·+Γ γ︸ ︷︷ ︸
n times
+Γξ = η → ξ ≡n η))
for n ≥ 2
(W8) v(x) = 0Γ →
∨
0≤i<p
0Γ < v(x− i)
1Weispfenning introduced another language without 1Γ or ≡n. We do not use it here.
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(W9)n ∃z
((( n∧
i=0
0Γ ≤ v(xi)
)
∧ (0Γ ≤ v(y)) ∧
(
0Γ < v
( n∑
i=0
xiy
i
))
∧(
0Γ = v
( n∑
i=1
ixiy
i−1
)))
→
(
(0Γ < v(z − y)) ∧
( n∑
i=0
xiz
i = 0
)))
for n ≥ 1 (Hensel’s lemma)
As noted above, Weispfenning’s language and axioms are a little more complex,
but their equivalence with MacIntyre’s is written out in Weispfenning’s paper [21].
Now let us formally state Kochen’s theorem in customary terms (we shall write
~X = (X1, . . . , Xn) where the Xi’s are indeterminates):
Theorem 2.11 (Kochen’s Theorem). Let K be a p-adically closed field. Then
f( ~X) ∈ K( ~X) is integral definite in K if and only if f( ~X) is integral over the ring
OK [γ(K( ~X))]T .
Here localizing at T is understood to be localizing at all elements of the form
1 + pv, where v ∈ OK [γ(K( ~X))]. f( ~X) being integral, of course, means, for some
m ∈ N, there exists an identity
fm +
wm−1
1 + pvm−1
fm−1 + · · ·+ w0
1 + pv0
= 0
for some wi, vi ∈ OK [γ(K( ~X))].
In fact, we will instead use a strengthening of this theorem due to Roquette [18]:
Theorem 2.12. Let K be a p-adically closed field. f( ~X) is integral definite if and
only if there exist g, h ∈ OK [γ(K( ~X))] such that f = g
1 + ph
.
We now give a brief overview of Kochen’s proof (Roquette’s proof uses places
and algebraic geometry and so is not as applicable to our goals). Firstly, if K is
p-valued, then for all x ∈ K, γ(x) ∈ O or γ(x) is undefined. (This is an analog
of the fact that x2 ≥ 0 for all x in an ordered field.) From this, the ‘if’ directions
in 2.11 and 2.12 follow easily. It can then be shown, using Zorn’s lemma (which
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is equivalent to the Axiom of Choice), that, up to isomorphism, there is a unique
p-adically closed extension to any p-valued field K whose value group is a Z-group
(this actually uses Zorn’s lemma twice). Then using the model completeness of
p-adically closed fields (like most model-theoretic results, this is not particularly
constructive) and analysis of how integral definiteness interacts with the properties
of p-adically closed fields, Kochen arrives at the conclusion of Theorem 2.11 [12].
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Chapter 3
Cleansing the Axiom of Choice
from Kochen’s Proof
The goal of this chapter is to prove the following theorem:
Theorem 3.1. The uses of Zorn’s Lemma in any proof of Theorem 2.12 can be
eliminated. Thus, Theorem 2.12 follows from ZF alone.
In order to formally cleanse Kochen’s proof of the Axiom of Choice it will suffice,
by Theorem 1.10, to formulate Theorem 2.12 as an arithmetic sentence.
Before doing that, however, let us discuss how exactly this process will work.
Go¨del, as part of the work leading to his incompleteness theorems, created an
arithmetization of logical syntax. This system assigned natural numbers (called
Go¨del numbers) to all of the logical and non-logical symbols in the language, which
allowed the rules for well-formed formulas and proofs to be phrased in arithmetic
terms as statements about natural numbers.1 As an example of the usefulness
of this idea, let us look at the first incompleteness theorem. It states that for
any consistent, recursive axiom system of arithmetic, there are sentences in LA
that are true in N but cannot be proven from those axioms. In proving the first
incompleteness theorem, Go¨del supposed that there exists an LA-formula β(x) such
that β(n) is true if and only if n is the Go¨del number of a sentence true in N. Then
he let n0 be the Go¨del number of ¬β and used it to construct a sentence in LA
that is either true and not in the set that β(x) defines, or false and in that set. In
either case it is clear that β(x) cannot define the set of sentences true in N.
1A development aimed specifically at number theory is in [6]. One aimed more generally at any formal system
is in [10].
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Our application of Go¨del numbers is to form a sentence with quantifiers ranging
only over the natural numbers that says ‘there exists an s that is the Go¨del number
of a proof of Kochen’s theorem’. This, since it is entirely arithmetic (we only
quantify over natural numbers), can be relativised to L where we can eliminate
the Axiom of Choice. This leaves us with a proof, which does not rely on AC, that
Kochen’s theorem can be proven in whatever system is adopted for p-adically closed
fields (discussed in Chapter 2). So we need to construct an arithmetic statement
that is equivalent to the informal statement that Kochen’s theorem can be proven.
Before doing that, however, let us look at how to arithmetize the syntax of
MacIntyre’s language. First we want to break the symbols up into two classes: the
logical symbols (∀,∃,¬,∨,∧,→,↔,=, (, ), and the variables v1, v2, etc.) and the
non-logical symbols (LM). Then we create a function h that assigns odd numbers
to the logical symbols and even numbers to the non-logical symbols. So for example
h(∀) = 1, h(v1) = 21, h(+) = 0, h(0) = 8 and h(P2) = 14. For expressions in the
formal language we assign the appropriate number to each symbol in order and
then let the Go¨del number of the expression equal the product of the primes raised
to the number of the symbol plus one. So, for example, V (0) ∧ V (1) is formalized
as V 0∧V 1 in LM , so the symbols’ numbers would be 12, 8, 9, 12, 10 and the Go¨del
number of the expression would be 213 ·39 ·510 ·713 ·1111. We can then show that the
basic ideas of the metamathematics (such as well-formed formulas and deductions)
can be represented in arithmetic. This follows a customary and familiar process as
in [6] or [10].
Now we can pursue the goal of this chapter, which is to show that the use of AC
in the form of Zorn’s lemma can be formally eliminated as claimed in Theorem 3.1.
In the formal language (Kochen, of course, used the informal ZFC-based system
of ordinary mathematics; that does not work for what we are doing here), we are
22
proving the conclusion of Theorem 2.12 from the axioms of p-adically closed fields,
which we designate as Πp. As stated above either one of our two axiom systems
for p-adically closed fields can be used as Πp.
So, fix n and d in N. Let
~X = (X1, . . . , Xn) (as before),
~A = (A1, . . . , A(n+dn )
), and
~B = (B1, . . . , B(n+dn )
)
be indeterminates. Let
α = (α1 . . . , αn) ∈ Nn be a multi-index,
~Xα = Xα11 · · ·Xαnn , and
|α| = α1 + · · ·+ αn.
(Note that the number of α ∈ Nn with |α| ≤ d is (n+d
n
)
.) Finally, let fn,d ∈
Q( ~A, ~B; ~X) be the general rational function of degree d in ~X:
fn,d( ~A, ~B; ~X) =
∑
|α|≤dAσ(α) ~X
α∑
|α|≤dBσ(α) ~X
α
,
where
σ : {α ∈ Nn | |α| ≤ d } →
{
1, 2, . . . ,
(
n+ d
n
)}
is some bijection. (As usual, we define the degree of a rational function to be the
maximum of the degrees of its numerator and denominator.)
Kochen’s Theorem says that if p is prime, K is p-adically closed, ~a,~b ∈ K(n+dn ),
and fn,d(~a,~b; ~X) is integral definite in ~X over K, then there exist g, h such that
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f =
g
1 + ph
, where
g =
m∑
i=1
ki
o∏
j=1
γ(lij), for some ki ∈ O and lij ∈ K( ~X), and
h =
m∑
i=1
k′i
o∏
j=1
γ(l′ij), for some k
′
i ∈ O and l′ij ∈ K( ~X).
Note that we can use the same m for both g and h, for if g, say, has more summands
than h, we may add some extra summands to h with the corresponding extra
coefficients k′i = 0. Similarly, we can use the same o for each summand in g and in
h, because we can choose some extra lij or l
′
ij such that γ(lij) = 1 or γ(l
′
ij) = 1, by
a simple application of Hensel’s Lemma. In fact, we can even arrange for m = o,
by replacing the smaller of m and o with the larger of the two numbers. So we
shall drop the letter o, and replace it with m from now on. Furthermore, we may
increase this new m so as to ensure that for all i, j, deg lij ≤ m and deg l′ij ≤ m.
Thus, we now have
g =
m∑
i=1
ki
m∏
j=1
γ(lij), for some ki ∈ O and lij ∈ K( ~X) with deg lij ≤ m, and
h =
m∑
i=1
k′i
m∏
j=1
γ(l′ij), for some k
′
i ∈ O and l′ij ∈ K( ~X) with deg l′ij ≤ m.
(3.1)
Lemma 3.2. The upper bound m in (3.1) can be chosen independently of ~a and
~b; i.e., m need depend only on n, d, and p.
Proof. This is a consequence of a “compactness” argument, as follows.
Let ~y := (y1, . . . , y(n+dn )
) and ~z := (z1, . . . , z(n+dn )
) be variables, and let φn,d,p(~y, ~z)
be an LM -formula expressing the condition that fn,d(~y, ~z; ~X) is integral definite in
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~X. Let ψn,d,p,m(~y, ~z) be an LM -formula expressing the condition that there exist
~sij = (si,j,1, . . . , si,j,(n+mn )
),
~tij = (ti,j,1, . . . , ti,j,(n+mn )
),
~s′ij = (s
′
i,j,1, . . . , s
′
i,j,(n+mn )
),
~t′ij = (t
′
i,j,1, . . . , t
′
i,j,(n+mn )
),
k1, . . . , km, and
k′1, . . . , k
′
m
such that V (ki), V (k
′
i), and f =
g
1 + ph
, where g, h are as in (3.1), and the ~sij,~tij
are the ~X-coefficients of the numerator and denominator of lij in (3.1), respectively,
and the ~s′ij,~t
′
ij are the ~X-coefficients of the numerator and denominator of l
′
ij. As
before, write Πp for Macintyre’s axioms. The contrapositive of Theorem 2.12 can
now be expressed as: For every model K of Πp and every ~a,~b ∈ K(
n+d
n ), if
¬ψn,d,p,1(~a,~b),¬ψn,d,p,2(~a,~b), . . .
all hold in K, then ¬φn,d,p(~a,~b) holds in K. By Go¨del’s completeness theorem,
there is a proof in LM from the axiom system
Πp ∪ {¬ψn,d,p,1(~y, ~z),¬ψn,d,p,2(~y, ~z), . . .} (3.2)
of the formula ¬φn,d,p(~y, ~z). Since any proof has finite length, only finitely many of
the axioms in (3.2) are actually used. Thus, there is some m ∈ N such that from
Πp ∪ {¬ψn,d,p,1(~y, ~z), . . . ,¬ψn,d,p,m(~y, ~z)}
we can prove ¬φn,d,p(~y, ~z). So from Πp ∪ {φn,d,p(~y, ~z)} we can prove
ψn,d,p,1(~y, ~z) ∨ · · · ∨ ψn,d,p,m(~y, ~z),
25
which, in turn, implies, more simply, ψn,d,p,m(~y, ~z). Thus by the Deduction Theorem
[6, pp. 118], for this m we have a proof from Πp alone of
φn,d,p(~y, ~z)→ ψn,d,p,m(~y, ~z);
and by the generalization rule,
∀~y, ~z(φn,d,p(~y, ~z)→ ψn,d,p,m(~y, ~z)), (3.3)
proving the lemma.
The above proof of (3.3) from Πp takes place in LM ; it depends on n, d, p, and
m (where m is sufficiently large, depending on n, d, and p). Let sn,d,p,m be the
Go¨del code of this proof. Let η be the LA-formula
∀n, d, p ∃m, s (s = the Go¨del code of a proof in LM of (3.3) from Πp).
We have thus proved η, using Theorem 2.12 (which was proved in ZFC). If we
interpret η in LS (as in Chapter 1), we see that η is an arithmetic sentence that
has been proved from ZFC. By Theorem 1.10, this proof can be transformed into
a proof of η from ZF alone, as claimed in Theorem 3.1.
A consequence of this ‘cleansing’ is that something akin to Kreisel’s ‘unwinding’
of Artin’s Theorem for real closed fields (Hilbert’s 17th problem) may be possible
with its p-adic analog, Kochen’s Theorem. This ‘unwinding’ is what Kreisel called
the process of extracting constructive content from seemingly non-constructive
proofs; a thorough overview is in [2] and [8]. Some ideas on how it may be accom-
plished in this case appear in Chapter 6.
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Chapter 4
Definable Skolem Functions for Qp
Our task now is to illuminate certain ideas that will be needed for our construction
of a p-adic closure of a p-valued field. Fundamentally this will revolve around two
processes to deal with Skolem functions. Introducing Skolem functions is a method
in logic to eliminate the use of existential quantifiers, which are the primary way
that non-constructive content is introduced. In order to use them in a way that
does not itself introduce constructively questionable content, we will have to show
that certain conditions hold and that the Skolem functions we are introducing are
definable in the original language. What follows is mainly a summary of Philip
Scowcroft’s work on this subject [19].
Definition 4.1. A theory T admits definable Skolem functions if for every formula
φ(~x, y) such that T proves ∃y φ(~x, y), there is a definable function f such that T
proves φ(~x, f(~x)).
The fact that the theory of p-adically closed fields admits definable Skolem
functions was originally due to van den Dries [5]. He used criteria from model
theory that did not provide a direct, constructive proof; this was provided by
Scowcroft [19]. A key element is:
Theorem 4.2. Let T be a model-complete L-theory and A a set of prenex Π2
sentences (i.e., sentences of the form ∀~x∃~y φ(~x, ~y) where φ is quantifier-free) which
axiomatizes T . Assume that T Skolemizes A: that is, for every ∀~x∃~y φ(~x, ~y) in A
there is a definable function f for which
T ` ∀~x φ(~x, f(~x)).
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Then T admits definable Skolem functions.
This theorem shows how to obtain definable Skolem functions in a primitive
recursive manner dependent on Weispfenning’s quantifier elimination (in [21]; see
Theorem 5.2 below for its statement). Specifically this depends on the fact that
Weispfenning’s quantifier elimination procedure is primitive recursive; Weispfen-
ning performed this in both his language LW and MacIntyre’s, LM . The idea is
that instead of using existential quantifiers, we extend the language to introduce
new functions that will replace the need for them. As an example, look at the
axiom schema (M7)n for LM :
∃z ((yn = x→ Pn(x)) ∧ (Pn(x)→ zn = x)).
The pertinent part can be written ∃z (Pn(x) → zn = x). What we do is replace
the quantifier by a function fn(x) so that the axiom becomes Pn(x)→ fn(x)n = x.
Provided that we can define the function fn in the original language, this will
allow us to replace all the existential quantifiers that the use of this axiom schema
introduces into our proof of Kochen’s Theorem. To demonstrate this we first need
a lemma of Denef’s [4, Lemma 7.1].
Lemma 4.3. Let S be a definable subset of Qm+qp . For ~x ∈ Qmp , let
Sx = {~y ∈ Qqp | (~x, ~y) ∈ S}.
Let α ∈ N, α ≥ 1. Suppose, for all ~x ∈ Qmp , that Sx is nonempty and that
CardSx ≤ α, where Card denotes the cardinality. Then there exist definable func-
tions f1(~x), . . . , fq(~x) from Qmp to Qp such that (~x, f1(~x), . . . , fq(~x)) ∈ S for all
~x ∈ Qmp .
This lemma provides a method to select one particular nth root of x. To see that
one of the nth roots can be singled out by this lemma, first note that there are at
28
most n of them; so letting α = n, the cardinality can be bounded as required. We
next define kth-power residues. This definition requires an alternate, equivalent
form of Hensel’s lemma often called the Hensel-Rychlik lemma (see [7, pps. 87-88]
for a proof of equivalence):
Lemma 4.4. A valued field K is Henselian if and only if for each f ∈ O[X]
and a ∈ O with v(f(a)) > 2v(f ′(a)), there exists α ∈ O with f(α) = 0 and
v(a− α) > v(f ′(a)). Here, O is the valuation ring and v(x) is the valuation.
Consider the multiplicative group K×. This lemma can used to prove that for
any k ∈ N, k ≥ 2, the index (i.e. [K× : K×k]) of the subgroup K×k of kth-powers
in K× is finite, and that we can choose natural numbers as representatives for the
cosets in the quotient group Q×p /Q×kp .
Definition 4.5. The kth-power residue of an element x ∈ K× is the coset xK×k.
By means of an easy induction on q, the proof of Lemma 4.3 reduces to the case
where q = 1. For q = 1 the proof breaks up into three cases:
1) Card Sx = 1,
2) The elements of Sx do not all have the same value, or
3) The elements of Sx do not all have the same kth-power residue for an arbitrary
k ∈ N, k ≥ 2.
What we are going to do is to repeatedly replace Sx by a smaller subset S
′
x in
order to reduce the cardinality of Sx (eventually) to 1. In case 1) there is no further
work to do. So assume CardSx ≥ 2. We then choose for membership in S ′x those
element(s) of Sx that have the lowest value. Then, if multiple elements have the
same value we can distinguish them by their kth-power residues. This builds on
work done by MacIntyre in [17].
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It should now be clear that the proof of case 3) above is the key to Denef’s
lemma. Denef’s proof was rather light on details, so I give a more detailed account
here. First, we want to adjust Sx so that the mean, y, of its elements is 0. This is
easily achieved by replacing the elements yi in Sx with yi − y. So we can assume
Sx = {y1, y2, . . . , ym} with y = 0 and m = CardSx ≤ n. Furthermore assume
m > 1 and v(y1) = v(y2) = · · · = v(ym). Write yi = pv(yi)y′i; then v(y′i) = 0, and
the mean of the y′i ’s is still 0.
Let κ = max
j=1,...,m
v(j) and choose k = φ(pκ+1), where φ is Euler’s totient function.
This means v(k) = v(φ(pκ+1)) = v((p − 1)pκ) = κ. Now, consider the finite set R
of positive integers of the form
b0 + b1p+ · · ·+ b2v(k)p2v(k),
where every bi belongs to {0, . . . , p−1} and b0 is not 0. If v(x) = 0 for some x ∈ Qp,
then there is a unique r from R with x = r+ p1+2v(k)z, where v(z) is nonnegative.
This means
x
r
= 1 + p1+2v(k)
z
r
with v
(
z
r
)
= v(z) ≥ 0. Lemma 4.4 can be used to show that x
r
is a kth-power in
Qp. Then x ∈ rQ×kp .
Returning to the y′i ’s, since we are assuming that the y
′
i ’s all have the same
kth-power residue, and since the y′i’s are of value 0 by construction, there is an
integer r ∈ R,
r = b0 + b1p+ · · ·+ b2κp2κ,
such that each y′i belongs to the coset of r. Thus each y
′
i is r times the kth-power
of an element ei. Both r and ei must have value 0, and, since k = (p − 1)pκ,
eki = 1+p
κ+1zi, where zi has nonnegative value. To see this we utilize induction on
κ. For κ = 0, we have k = p− 1, and ep−1i = 1 + pzi by Fermat’s Little Theorem,
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as required. For κ > 0, suppose we have found zi such that e
k
i = 1 + p
κ+1zi. We
must find w with nonnegative value such that ekpi = 1 + p
κ+2w. To do this, note
that ekpi = (e
k
i )
p = (1 + pκ+1)pzi by the inductive hypothesis. This equals
1 +
(
p
1
)
pκ+1zi +
(
p
2
)
(pκ+1zi)
2 + · · ·+
(
p
p− 1
)
(pκ+1zi)
p−1 +
(
p
p
)
(pκ+1zi)
p.
The second term has pκ+2 as a factor. For the third term, p2κ+3 is a factor; for the
penultimate term, p(p−1)κ+p is a factor. Since the last term has ppκ+p as a factor,
all the terms but the first have pκ+2 as a factor. This causes ekpi = 1 + p
κ+2w for
some w with nonnegative value.1
To continue, we now have each y′i = r(1+p
κ+1zi), and since the elements y
′
i have
sum 0 (since yi is 0), 0 = r
(
m+
∑
i
pκ+1zi
)
. Since r has value 0, m = pκ+1
(
−∑
i
zi
)
and so κ+1 ≤ v(m), contrary to the choice of κ (recall κ = max
j=1,...,m
v(j) so v(m) ≤ κ)
and case 3). Therewith Lemma 4.3 is proven.2
This can now be combined with Scowcroft’s work in [19] and Weispfenning’s
quantifier elimination in [21] to construct the defining formula φ(x, y) in LM of a
Skolem function for the nth root of x. Defining the Skolem function for Hensel’s
Lemma in a primitive recursive manner can be handled entirely with Scowcroft
and Weispfenning’s work. This means that we do not really need to extend the
language with additional symbols for the Skolem functions; we can define the new
symbols as shorthand, as we did with the new symbols we introduced in Chapter
1. So the definable Skolem functions allow us to replace the existential quantifiers
that occur in our axioms with terms. We will use this in our construction of p-adic
closures in Chapter 5.
1My thanks to R. Perlis for his aide with this induction argument.
2This elucidation of Denef’s proof relies heavily on correspondence from P. Scowcroft.
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Chapter 5
A Construction of a P-adic Closure
Definition 5.1. A field L is called a p-adic closure of a p-valued field K if L is a
maximal p-valued extension field of K that is algebraic over K. Equivalently, L is
a p-adically closed algebraic extension of K whose unique p-valuation extends the
valuation on K.
In this section we want to present a finitary construction of the p-adic closure
of a p-valued field. In order to do this we first have to set some limitations. One
fact that we should recognize is that the p-adic closure of a p-valued field is not
in general unique, in contrast to the fact that the real closure of an ordered field
is always unique. The reason for this, however, is that the value group can be
extended in different ways. If we simply choose an appropriate extension of the
value group, or alternatively require that the value group begins as a Z-group,
then the p-adic closure will be unique. Therefore if we wish our p-adic closure to
be unique, we would need, as a preliminary step, to ensure that the value group is
a Z-group.
Next, whether the p-adic closure of the given p-valued field is unique or not, we
must obviously assume that the field operations in K (+,−, ·,−1) are computable
and the predicates in K (V, P2, P3, . . .) decidable in order to effectively construct
a p-adic closure.
For this section we will write PCF for the first-order formal system in the lan-
guage of valued fields (LM) based on an appropriate set of logical axioms and rules
of inference for the classical, first-order predicate calculus with equality (e.g., see
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[10]), together with the non-logical axioms for MacIntyre’s language (M1)-(M8)
which we hope the reader will recall from Chapter 2.
Let K be a p-valued field. We will denote by PCF(K) the formal system whose
language, LM(K), is LM supplemented by constant symbols ck for each k ∈ K,
and whose axioms are (M1)-(M8) supplemented by the diagram of K. The lat-
ter is defined to be the set of those atomic LM(K)-sentences and negated atomic
LM(K)-sentences that hold in K. We will also make use of Weispfenning’s quan-
tifier elimination for p-valued fields (see [21]):
Theorem 5.2. To any formula φ in the language LM of valued fields, we can, in
a primitive recursive way, associate two objects:
(1) a quantifier-free formula ψ in LM and
(2) a proof in PCF of the equivalence φ↔ ψ.
The notation PCF(K) ` θ will mean there is a proof of θ in PCF(K).
Corollary 5.3. PCF(K) is logically complete; i.e., for every sentence φ in LM(K),
either PCF(K) ` φ or PCF(K) ` ¬φ (and we can decide which if K is com-
putable).
If for a formula φ(x) in LM(K) with no free variables other than x,
PCF(K) ` ∃x ∀y (φ(x) ∧ (φ(y)→ x = y)),
then we call φ(x) uniquely satisfiable. We call uniquely satisfiable LM(K)-formulas
φ(x) and ψ(x) equivalent if
PCF(K) ` ∃x (φ(x) ∧ ψ(x)).
We shall define the elements of our p-adic closure, P , to be the equivalence
classes [φ(x)] of uniquely satisfiable LM(K)-formulas φ(x).
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We then have to define all the field operations on P . Define [φ(x)] +P [ψ(y)] to
be [θ(z)], where θ(z) is:
∃x∃y (φ(x) ∧ ψ(y) ∧ z = x+ y).
We define ·P similarly. We define −P [φ(x)] as [ψ(y)], where ψ(y) is ∃x (φ(x)∧ y =
−x). We define [φ(x)]−1P as [ψ(y)], where ψ(y) is ∃x (φ(x) ∧ (y = x−1). We define
0P and 1P as [x = 0] and [x = 1], respectively.
Next we verify that the field axioms hold for these definitions. For commutativity
of addition we need that for uniquely satisfiable φ and ψ,
[φ(x)] +P [ψ(y)] = [ψ(y)] +P [φ(x)],
which simplifies to:
PCF (K) ` ∃x∃y (φ(x) ∧ ψ(y) ∧ x+ y = y + x).
This is established by the field axioms and the unique satisfiability of φ and ψ. To
see that P satisfies (M2) we need to break it into two cases; the first case is where
[φ(x)] = [x = 0] and the second case is where [φ(x)] 6= [x = 0]. For the first case
we need to show [x = 0]−1 = [x = 0], which means
PCF(K) ` ∃y (∃x (x = 0 ∧ y = x−1) ∧ y = 0).
This is true since 0−1 = 0, which follows from PCF(K), by (M2). In the second
case we need to show [φ(x)] ·P [∃x (φ(x) ∧ y = x−1)] = [x = 1]. This follows from
xx−1 = 1, which in turn follows from PCF(K) in this case.
The other field axioms can be handled similarly, except for 0P 6= 1P . Since
0P 6= 1P means
PCF(K) 0 ∃x (x = 0 ∧ x = 1),
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or equivalently, PCF(K) 0 0 = 1, this is equivalent to the consistency of PCF(K)
(since PCF(K) ` 0 6= 1). This consistency must be proved by finitary, syntactic
means and not in the usual way by appealing to the existence of a model of
PCF(K), which is precisely what we are trying to construct. A finitary consistency
proof could be extracted from an unwinding process on the proof of Kochen’s
Theorem; further thoughts on this are included in Chapter 6.
Consistency can also be used to show that P has characteristic 0. To show this
we need to show that
[x = 1] +P · · ·+P [x = 1] 6= [x = 0]
for any number of summands n, n ≥ 1. This means
PCF(K) 0 ∃z
(
∃x1, . . . , xn(x1 = 1 ∧ · · · ∧ xn = 1 ∧ z = x1 + · · ·+ xn) ∧ z = 0
)
This is equivalent to PCF(K) 0 1+1+· · ·+1 = 0. Assuming PCF(K) is consistent,
this follows from (M1)n.
Next we need to define a valuation ring O in P : [φ(x)] ∈ O iff
PCF(K) ` ∃x(φ(x) ∧ V (x)).
Similarly, we define Pn in P : [φ(x)] ∈ Pn iff
PCF(K) ` ∃x ∃z(φ(x) ∧ zn = x).
To show P satisfies (M3) we need to show
PCF(K) ` ∃x (x = 0 ∧ V (x)) ∧ ∃y (y = 1 ∧ V (y)) ∧ ¬∃z (z = p−1 ∧ V (z))
∧
( (∃x(φ(x) ∧ V (x)) ∧ ∃y(ψ(y) ∧ V (y)))→(∃z(z = x− y ∧ V (z)) ∧ ∃w(w = xy ∧ V (w)))).
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This simplifies to
PCF(K) `
(
V (0) ∧ V (1) ∧ ¬V (p−1) ∧ ((V (x) ∧ V (y))→ (V (x− y) ∧ V (xy)))
)
.
This is precisely (M3). That P satisfies (M4) and (M5) follows similarly. For
(M8)n we need to show that
PCF(K) `
n−1∨
r=0
∨
1≤a<p2v(n)+1
p-a
∃x∃zra(φ(x) ∧ znra = x(apr)−1).
This follows from the fact that (M8)n is an axiom in PCF.
Next we will use Scowcroft’s Theorem 4.2 as applied to p-adically closed fields to
produce a uniquely satisfiable formula for both of the axiom schemata that involve
existential quantifiers ((M6)n, (M7)n) [19]. Using these functions we can define the
w whose existence axiom schema (M6)n asserts and the z whose existence axiom
schema (M7)n asserts to be the equivalence classes of the uniquely satisfiable
formulas that define the appropriate Skolem functions (as described in Chapter 4).
Thus, P satisfies all of MacIntyre’s axioms, and so it is p-adically closed.
Next, K can be embedded as a valued subfield of P by the mapping k 7→ [x = ck]
(k ∈ K), which one can easily check to be a value-preserving embedding since
PCF(K) contains the diagram of K.
What is left is to show that every element [φ(x)] of P is algebraic over K. By
Theorem 5.2 we can represent [φ(x)] by a quantifier-free formula ψ(x) containing
no variables other than x. Now, we can organize ψ(x) into disjunctive normal form:
∨
i
(∧
j
pij = 0 ∧
∧
j
qij 6= 0 ∧
∧
j
V (rij) ∧
k∧
n=2
(∧
j
Pn(snij)
)
∧
k∧
n=2
(∧
j
¬Pn(unij)
))
,
where pij, qij, rij, snij and unij are terms in LM(K) (built up from x, 0, 1, and
finitely many ck by the field operations +,−, ·,−1). We did not include negated
atomic formulas ¬V (rij) in our disjunctive normal form above, because ¬V (x)↔
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V ((px)−1). The terms pij, qij, rij, snij and unij can be viewed as rational functions
in x with coefficients in K. Now, for some i there exists an x satisfying the ith
disjunct, since φ(x) was (uniquely) satisfiable; fix that i. The subset of P defined
by ∧
j
qij 6= 0 ∧
∧
j
V (rij) ∧
k∧
n=2
(∧
j
Pn(snij)
)
∧
k∧
n=2
(∧
j
¬Pn(unij)
)
can be shown to be either empty or infinite. Therefore, since φ(x) is uniquely
satisfiable, at least one of the pij is non-constant when viewed as a function of
x. It follows that [φ(x)] is algebraic over K. Thus, P is a p-adic closure of K, as
claimed.
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Chapter 6
Further Considerations
The full ‘unwinding’ process for the proof of Kochen’s Theorem would revolve
primarily on two processes which are analagous to processes used in the real closed
case of ‘unwinding’ the proof of Artin’s Theorem [2] [14]. In the real closed case
these are to address the squares and odd-degree polynomials. Kreisel showed how
this could be done in [14]. In the p-adic case analagous processes would need to be
found for the nth-powers and for ‘Hensel’-polynomials of the form
xn + xn−1 + an−2xn−2 + . . .+ a1x+ a0 ∈ O[x], ai ∈M.
Recall, M is the maximal ideal of the valuation ring O. In addition to these two
cases it is also important to build tools to more deeply analyze the functioning of
the γ-operator (2.1).
In the case of the nth-roots we can use Denef’s Lemma 4.3 to mimic Kreisel’s
work on finding square roots. It will require more cases, and consequently more
complicated formulas but presents no ultimate challenge.
The difficulty lies with finding a way to reduce a ‘Hensel’-polynomial to another
‘Hensel’-polynomial with a common root but lower degree. This could potentially
be tackled by converting to other forms of Hensel’s lemma, but thus far despite
extensive efforts I have yet to succeed and it remains an open problem.
The γ-operator has also proven difficult to work with. One result that could help
open this portion of the ‘unwinding’ process would be to find a way to write any
element of the field K in the form
∑∏
γ(xij) +
1
p
(∑∏
γ(yij)
)
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. This would be analagous to the fact that in a field of characteristic not 2 any
element r can be written as
r =
(
1 + r
2
)2
+ (−1)
(
1− r
2
)2
.
Unfortunately the nature of the γ-operator has made this an extremely difficult
process to construct.
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